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Abstract
Precise rules are developed in order to formalize the reasoning processes involved in
standard non-relativistic quantum mechanics, with the help of analogies from classical
physics. A classical or quantum description of a mechanical system involves a frame-
work, often chosen implicitly, and a statement or assertion about the system which
is either true or false within the framework with which it is associated. Quantum
descriptions are no less “objective” than their classical counterparts, but differ from
the latter in the following respects: (i) The framework employs a Hilbert space rather
than a classical phase space. (ii) The rules for constructing meaningful statements
require that the associated projectors commute with each other and, in the case of
time-dependent quantum histories, that consistency conditions be satisfied. (iii) There
are incompatible frameworks which cannot be combined, either in constructing de-
scriptions or in making logical inferences about them, even though any one of these
frameworks may be used separately for describing a particular physical system.
A new type of “generalized history” is introduced which extends previous proposals
by Omne`s, and Gell-Mann and Hartle, and a corresponding consistency condition which
does not involve density matrices or single out a direction of time. Applications which
illustrate the formalism include: measurements of spin, two-slit diffraction, and the
emergence of the classical world from a fully quantum description.
I Introduction
Seventy years after non-relativistic quantum mechanics reached what is essentially its present
form, the ongoing controversy over its conceptual foundations and the proper interpretation
of wave functions, measurements, quantum probabilities, and the like shows no sign of abat-
ing. Indeed, modern experiments involving neutron diffraction, ions in traps, and quantum
optics seem to cry out for a more satisfactory formulation of basic quantum ideas than was
available to Feynman [1] when he remarked, in comparing special relativity and quantum
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theory, that while the former was well understood, “nobody understands quantum mechan-
ics.”
This lack of understanding manifests itself in various ways. Take, for example, the well-
known fact that the predictions of standard quantum mechanics violate Bell’s inequality [2].
From this it might seem reasonable to conclude that all derivations of Bell’s inequality contain
one or more errors, in the sense that either the premises or the procedures of logical inference
entering the argument violate one or more principles of standard quantum mechanics. Had
someone in 1964 attempted to publish an inequality violating the predictions of special
relativity, the experts would have pointed out precisely where the reasoning went astray as
soon as the argument reached the printed page, if not earlier. But this did not happen in the
case of Bell’s work. Indeed, much of the subsequent literature on the subject [3] would lead
one to believe that standard quantum mechanics is either wrong, or illogical, or unintelligible,
or at the very least contains a hidden assumption that the world is non-local, an assumption
which completely escaped the physicists who first developed the theory (because they did not
understand what they were doing?). This despite the fact that all predictions of standard
quantum mechanics seem amply supported by every experimental test designed to uncover
some flaw.
As a second example, consider the recent assertion by Englert et al. [4] that Bohmian
mechanics [5, 6] makes predictions (or at least retrodictions) which disagree with the results
of standard quantum mechanics and also with common sense: detectors designed to detect
particles passing through them can actually be triggered by particles which, according to
the Bohmian interpretation, never come close to the detector. One might have imagined
that this observation would have prompted advocates of Bohmian mechanics to withdraw
or modify their claim [7] that this theory reproduces all the results of standard quantum
mechanics, especially given an independent verification [8] of the essential correctness of the
calculations by Englert et al. Instead, the response [8, 9] has been that standard quantum
mechanics, in contrast to Bohmian mechanics, does not provide an adequate theoretical
framework for sensibly discussing whether the particle passed through the detector; thus
one must take the Bohmian result seriously, as the precise outcome of a well-defined theory,
however counterintuitive it may appear to be.
The ultimate goal of the research reported in the present article is to place non-relativistic
quantum mechanics on as firm and precise a conceptual foundation as that of special rel-
ativity. This is not as ambitious a project as might at first seem to be the case, for two
reasons. First, a large part of non-relativistic quantum theory is already in a quite sat-
isfactory state, at least by the somewhat lax standards of theoretical physics. The basic
conceptual difficulties are focused in a small (but critical) area, the point at which the math-
ematical formalism of Schro¨dinger’s equation, Hilbert space operators, and the like, which
by now is quite well understood, is used to generate the probabilities needed to compare
theoretical predictions with experimental results. Second, a set of ideas which seem to be
adequate for integrating the probabilistic and deterministic aspects of quantum theory into
a coherent whole are already in the published literature, although their significance has not
been widely appreciated. The first of these ideas is von Neumann’s formulation of quantum
theory using closed subspaces of Hilbert space to represent quantum properties [10]—to be
carefully distinguished from his theory of measurements [11] and his proposal (together with
Birkhoff) of a special quantum logic [12], neither of which are employed in the formulation
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of quantum theory presented here. Next comes the concept of a consistent history [13],
followed by Omne`s’ proposal that quantum reasoning must involve separate “logics” [14],
and the Gell-Mann and Hartle decoherence functional [15]. To this list the present article
adds one new idea, or at least a new word: the framework in which a classical or quantum
description is embedded, and relative to which its truth must be assessed.
A framework corresponds to a consistent family in the notation of [13], or a “logic” in the
notation of [14]. It is closely related (but not identical) to the concept of an “interpretation”
in mathematical logic [16]. The key to making sense out of the description of a quantum
system, either at a single time or as it develops in time, is to note that such a description
cannot be made without adopting, at least implicitly, some framework; that the truth of
such a description is relative to its framework; and that reasoning in the quantum domain
requires the use of compatible frameworks. All of these concepts can be made quite precise,
and using them should help clear up (what I regard as) some misunderstandings, and respond
to various criticisms of the consistent history program [17, 18, 19].
The present work is very much indebted to Omne`s’ ideas [14]. A crucial difference is
that the notion of “truth” is made to depend explicitly on the framework, following certain
classical analogies, Sec. II A, and the example of formal logic. By contrast, Omne`s defined
“truth” in terms of “facts” which arise in a quasi-classical approximation, Sec. V D. The
latter does not seem an entirely satisfactory approach for a fundamental theory of nature,
and certain criticisms have been made by d’Espagnat [18], and by Dowker and Kent [19].
Omne`s himself [20] agrees that his approach has some problems.
The conceptual structure presented in this paper appears adequate to support the posi-
tion of Englert et al. [4] (the arguments are not presented here), and to find the mistakes
(from the perspective of standard quantum mechanics) in at least some derivations of Bell’s
inequality; see [21]. There are other derivations of Bell’s inequality which rest upon counter-
factual reasoning: what would have happened if something had been different; in addition,
many quantum paradoxes involve a counterfactual element. Analyzing these will require an
extension of the ideas discussed here; see Sec. VI B.
While its main goal is the clarification of conceptual issues through the introduction
of suitably precise rules of reasoning in the quantum domain, this paper also contains, in
Sec. IV, some new results on quantum histories and consistency conditions. The represen-
tation of histories through the use of projectors on tensor products of copies of the Hilbert
space seems to be a new idea, and the notion of a “generalized” history based upon this
representation includes, but also goes well beyond, previous proposals by the author [13, 22],
Omne`s [14], and Gell-Mann and Hartle [15]. The “consistency functional” introduced in the
same context generalizes the “decoherence functional” of Gell-Mann and Hartle [15], and
results in a formulation of fundamental quantum theory which is (transparently) invariant
under reversing the direction of time.
Philosophical issues are not the main topic of this paper. However, its central argument
provides a number of details supporting a proposal, found in an earlier publication [23], for
interpreting quantum mechanics in a “realistic” manner.
Many of the crucial features which distinguish quantum reasoning from its classical coun-
terpart already arise when one considers a single mechanical system at a single instant of
time. Hence Secs. II and III, in which the quantum description of a system at one time is
developed with the help of classical analogies, form the heart of this paper. In particular,
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discussing both classical and quantum systems from the same point of view helps avoid
the error of supposing that the latter somehow involve a subjective element not present
in the former, while bringing out the genuine differences between the reasoning processes
appropriate in the two situations.
Describing how a quantum system evolves in time turns out to be, formally at least,
very similar to describing its properties at a single time if one employs the technical tools in
Sec. IV, which allow a history to be represented by a single projector on a tensor product
space. The notion of consistency has, to be sure, no counterpart in a system at a single time,
and discussing it in a precise and general way makes Sec. IV more complicated than the
other parts of the paper. The reader who is unfamiliar with the use of consistent histories
in quantum mechanics should look elsewhere [13, 14, 22] for a discussion of the physical
motivation behind the consistency requirement, and simple examples of its use.
The applications in Sec. V can be understood without the technical machinery of Sec. IV
if the reader is willing to accept various results on faith; the proofs are, in any case, not
included in this paper. These examples are not new (except, perhaps, for the discussion of
two-slit diffraction), but have been chosen to illustrate the formulation of quantum reasoning
introduced earlier in the paper. Sec. VI contains a summary of this formulation, together
with a list of open questions.
II Classical Reasoning
II A Frameworks and Descriptions
A scientific description of a physical system is, at best, an abstract, symbolic representation
of reality, or of what the scientist believes that reality to be; the description is never reality
itself. Thus it necessarily embodies certain elements of human choice. Nonetheless, at
least in the “classical” world of our everyday experience, it is not unreasonable to claim
that such a description is, or at least might be, a faithful or “true” representation of reality.
Understanding the process of description in the classical realm will assist us in understanding
how elements of choice can enter quantum descriptions without necessarily making them any
less “objective” than their classical counterparts.
As a first example, consider representing a three-dimensional object, such as a vase, by
means of a two-dimensional drawing which shows a projection of the object on a particular
plane. It will be convenient to refer to the choice of projection plane and the various con-
ventions for representing salient features of the object in the drawing as a framework F , and
the drawing itself as a statement, f , with the pair (F , f) constituting a description of the
object. The following are obvious properties of such descriptions:
1. A framework is chosen by the person making the description, and without such a choice
no description is possible.
2. Choosing a framework has, by itself, no influence on the object being described; on the
other hand it constrains what can correctly be said about the object. (Features which
are visible in one projection may well be invisible in another.)
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3. A framework by itself is neither true nor false. A statement can be true (i.e., a correct
representation of the object) or false, but to determine which it is, one must know the
corresponding framework. That is, truth or falsity is relative to the framework.
4. The correctness of a description can be tested experimentally. (For example, the
distance between two points on the drawing can be checked by measuring the distance
between the corresponding features on the object, provided one knows the projection
plane and the scale of the drawing.)
5. An arbitrary collection of descriptions, each of which applies individually to the object,
can always be thought of as parts of a collective or composite description of the object.
Apart from the comments in parentheses, every item in this list, with the sole excep-
tion of 5, also applies to a quantum description! That is, quantum descriptions are no less
“objective” or “realistic” than their classical counterparts. However, they are different (re-
flecting, one might suppose, the peculiar nature of quantum reality) in that it is not always
possible to combine various descriptions which might separately apply to a particular object
into a single composite description. This feature has no classical analog (that we know of),
and hence understanding what it means is essential for consistent quantum reasoning. In
particular, one needs an appropriate mathematical formalism, discussed in Secs. III and IV
below, giving the precise rules for combining (or not combining) quantum descriptions, and
reasoning about them, together with examples, of which there are some in Sec. V, which
illustrate the rules.
Each of the five points in the preceding list can be illustrated using as an example the
intrinsic angular momentum or spin, measured in units of ~, of a spin 1/2 quantum particle.
One possible description, which employs the x component of the spin, has the form:
(Sx, 1/2), (1)
where Sx is the framework and 1/2 is the statement. Together they form the description
usually written as Sx = 1/2. Another equally good description is:
(Sx,−1/2), (2)
or Sx = −1/2. Because (1) and (2) employ the same framework, the same (framework
dependent!) notion of “truth” applies to both. In fact, if (1) is true, (2) is false, and vice
versa. Choosing the framework Sx, i.e., choosing to talk about Sx, does not make Sx = 1/2
true or false, in fact, it has no effect whatsoever on the spin of the particle. However, such
an assertion is subject to experimental verification (or falsification) “in principle”, that is
to say, in terms of idealized experiments which, while they may not be practical, at least
do not violate the principles of quantum theory itself. Thus we might imagine that the
spin 1/2 particle is a neutron traveling slowly towards a Stern-Gerlach apparatus whose
magnetic field gradient is in the x direction, equipped with a pair of counters to determine
the channel in which the neutron emerges. If the neutron later emerges in the +1/2 channel,
that will verify the correctness of the description Sx = 1/2 at the present time, before the
neutron enters the field gradient. Even the “classical” problem of checking a two-dimensional
projection of a three-dimensional object by making measurements on the object requires a
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certain theoretical analysis: relating the distance between two points on the drawing to
the measured distance between the corresponding features on the object requires knowing
both the projection plane and the scale factor of the drawing, and using some trigonometry.
Similarly, experimental verification of a quantum description requires an appropriate theory
of measurement, as discussed in Sec. V A.
We now come to item 5 in the list. The description
(Sz,−1/2), (3)
or Sz = −1/2, which uses the z component of the spin, is on a par with (1) or (2). It simply
represents a “projection” of the particle’s angular momentum on a different axis. Were we
dealing with a classical spinning object there would be not the slightest problem in combining
its various components of angular momentum into a complete description corresponding
to a three-dimensional vector. But in the quantum case, the frameworks Sx and Sz are
incompatible, a term which will later receive a precise definition, and as a consequence one
of the basic rules of quantum descriptions asserts that there is no way to combine Sx = 1/2
and Sz = −1/2 into a single description. Note that this is not the assertion that if Sx = 1/2
is “true”, then Sz = −1/2 is “false”. Truth and falsity are concepts relative to a particular
framework, and in the case of descriptions using Sx and Sz, there is no single framework in
which a common notion of truth can be applied to both of them.
The issue of compatibility of frameworks arises because standard quantum mechanics,
unlike classical mechanics, employs a Hilbert space, rather than a classical phase space,
for descriptions. Incompatibility reflects the fact that certain operators do not commute
with each other, a peculiarly quantum phenomenon. In terms of a spin 1/2 particle, the
Hilbert space structure manifests itself in the following way. Descriptions (1), (2), and (3)
correspond, as is well known, to particular one-dimensional subspaces or rays of the two-
dimensional Hilbert space H which represents the spin of the particle; in fact, they are the
subspaces spanned by the corresponding eigenvectors of the operator Sx or Sz. But as there
are no simultaneous eigenvectors of Sx and Sz, there are no subspaces of H which might
be thought of as corresponding to Sx = 1/2 and Sz = −1/2, that is, to the conjunction
of these two descriptions. Another way of thinking about the matter is to note that in
classical mechanics, specifying the z component of angular momentum provides additional
information beyond that obtained through specifying the x component, whereas for a spin
1/2 particle one cannot specify any information in addition to Sx = 1/2, which is already a
pure state.
It is helpful to think of a framework, classical or quantum, as defining a “topic of conver-
sation” and, just as in ordinary conversation, in scientific discourse the framework is often
chosen implicitly. The phrase “oranges cost 25 cents each at the supermarket” both defines
a topic of conversation and simultaneously asserts something about the nature of the world,
and the same is true of “Sx = 1/2”. While it is hard to imagine any efficient scheme of
scientific communication which did not define frameworks implicitly most of the time, it is
sometimes helpful, especially in the quantum case, to reflect upon just what framework is
being used at some point in a discussion, as this can help avoid the nonsensical statements
and general confusion which arises when an invalid change of framework occurs in the middle
of an argument.
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II B Classical Phase Space
The usual framework for discussing a classical mechanical system of N particles at a single
instant of time is provided by its 6N -dimensional phase space D, in which a single point x
represents the state of the system at the time in question. A statement p, such as: “the total
energy is between 10 and 11 ergs”, can then be thought of as associated with the subset
P = ϕ(p) (4)
of points in D where p is true, that is, the set contained between two surfaces of constant
energy, one at 10 ergs and the other at 11 ergs. The negation of p, denoted ∼p, corresponds
to DrP , the complement of P in D, the region in the phase space for which the energy is less
than 10 ergs or greater than 11 ergs. Another statement q: “there are exactly 35 particles in
the volume element V1”, where V1 denotes some definite region in three-dimensional space,
corresponds to the subset Q = ϕ(q) of D. The conjunction of p and q, “energy between
10 and 11 ergs and 35 particles in V1”,written p ∧ q, corresponds to the intersection P ∩ Q
of the sets P and Q. Thus one sees that various “elementary” statements which describe
properties of the system can be mapped onto subsets ofD, and other “composite” statements
formed from the elementary statements by use of the logical operations “not”, “and”, “or”,
denoted respectively by ∼,∧,∨, are then also mapped to subsets of D using complements,
intersections, and unions of the sets corresponding to the elementary statements. Note that
under the operations of complement, union, and intersection, the subsets ofD form a Boolean
algebra B.
It will be convenient to think of the framework F as consisting of elementary and com-
posite statements, together with the set D, the Boolean algebra B of its subsets, and the
function ϕ which maps the statements onto elements of B. A description (F , f), where f is
one of the statements, corresponds to the assertion that the state of the mechanical system
is one of the points in the subset F = ϕ(f), and is true or false depending upon whether the
point x corresponding to the actual state of the system at the time in question is or is not in
F . Note that many different statements may correspond to the same F ; for example, p∨∼p
for any statement p is mapped onto the entire phase space D. When it is not important
to distinguish the different possibilities corresponding to some F , one may use a description
(F , F ), with F a surrogate for any statement which is mapped onto it by ϕ.
A description formed in this way is what in first-order predicate logic [16] is called an
interpretation. For our purposes it suffices to summarize the rules of logical reasoning, modus
ponens and the like, as applied to descriptions of our classical mechanical system, in the
following way. The logical process of inference from a set of assumptions to valid conclusions
consists in taking the intersection, let us call it A, of all the subsets of D corresponding to all
of the assumptions—if one prefers, A is the image under ϕ of the single statement consisting
of the conjunction (“and”) of all the assumptions. Then any conclusion which corresponds
to a subset C of D which contains A is a valid conclusion from these assumptions. That is
to say, logical reasoning in this context is the process of checking that if there is any x in D
for which all the assumptions are true, then for this x the conclusion will also be true. Note
that the process of inference can begin with no assumptions at all, in which case one sets A
equal to D, and a valid conclusion is a tautology, such as p∨∼p.
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III Quantum Systems at One Time
III A Quantum Frameworks
The counterpart for a quantum system of the classical phase space D is a Hilbert space
H, and an elementary statement p which ascribes to the quantum system a property at a
particular time is associated with a closed subspace P of H or, equivalently, the projector
(orthogonal projection operator) P onto this subspace. For example, if p is the assertion that
“the total energy is between 10 and 11 ergs”, the subspace P is spanned by the eigenvectors
of H with eigenvalues (assumed, for simplicity, to be discrete) which lie between 10 and 11
ergs. The negation ∼p, which asserts that the energy lies outside this interval, corresponds
to the orthogonal complement P⊥ of P (not to be confused with H rP), with projector
I − P , where I is the identity operator on H.
A framework F in the quantum case is generated by a finite collection of elementary
statements associated with projectors onto closed subspaces of H provided these projectors
commute with each other. The projector associated with a statement p will be denoted
by ϕ(p). The additional statements belonging to F are produced from the elementary
statements using logical operations, as discussed in Sec. II, and are mapped by ϕ onto
projectors consistent with the rules
ϕ(∼p) = I − ϕ(p), ϕ(p ∧ q) = ϕ(p)ϕ(q). (5)
(These rules suffice, because every logical operation can be built up using “not” and “and”.)
The smallest family B of commuting projectors closed under complements and products,
and containing the projectors associated with the statements of F , is a Boolean algebra in
which the operations of ∩ and ∪, thought of as acting on pairs of projectors, are defined by
P ∩Q = PQ, P ∪Q = P +Q− PQ, (6)
and whose least and largest elements are ∅ (the zero operator) and I, respectively. The
framework F can then be defined as the collection of statements generated from a set of
elementary statements by logical operations, along with the Hilbert spaceH and the mapping
ϕ which carries statements onto the Boolean algebra B of commuting projectors in the
manner indicated above.
A quantum description (F , f) consists of a framework F and a statement f belonging
to the collection of statements associated with F . Sometimes it is convenient to use a
description (F , F ), where the projector F is an element of the Boolean algebra B associated
with F , and serves as a surrogate for any f mapped to this F by ϕ. As long as F is
held fixed, there is a close analogy with classical descriptions based upon a phase space as
discussed in Sec. II B above. Since all the projectors in the Boolean algebra B associated
with F commute with each other, it is possible to choose a representation in which they
are simultaneously diagonal, which means that each diagonal element 〈j|P |j〉 of a projector
P = ϕ(p) in B is either 0 or 1. If one thinks of the set of labels {j} of the diagonal elements
as constituting a set D, then the subset of D where 〈j|P |j〉 = 1 is analogous to the set of
points in the classical phase space D where the statement p is true. This analogy works very
well as long as F is held fixed, and permits one to construct the rules for quantum reasoning
in close analogy with their classical counterparts.
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In particular, one thinks of a quantum description (F , p) as true provided the quantum
system at the time in question is “in” the subspace onto which P = ϕ(p) projects. To
be more precise, if we assume that any projector B belonging to the Boolean algebra B
associated with F represents a statement about, or property of the quantum system which
is true at the time in question, then this implies the truth of any statement s with the
property that
BS = B, (7)
where S = ϕ(s) is the projector corresponding to s, that is, provided the subspace onto
which B projects is contained in the subspace onto which S projects. Just as in the case
of the classical descriptions discussed in Sec. II, the truth of a quantum description must
always be thought of as relative to a framework, which may have been defined implicitly.
Hence it is best to think of “(F , f) is true” as meaning: “Given F , then f is true.”
Quantum reasoning within the context provided by a single framework F proceeds in the
following way. The assumptions of the argument, a1, a2, . . . al, which must all be statements
belonging to F , are mapped by ϕ onto a set of projectors A1, A2, . . . Al belonging to B, whose
product is:
A = A1A2 · · ·Al. (8)
Then a statement c in F is a valid conclusion provided AC = A, where C = ϕ(c).
III B Compatible and Incompatible Frameworks
The most important differences between classical and quantum descriptions emerge when
one considers several different frameworks. In the classical case, as long as the frameworks
refer to the same system, there is no problem in combining the corresponding descriptions.
But in the quantum case this is no longer true, and it is necessary to pay attention to the
rules which state when descriptions can and cannot be combined.
A finite collection of frameworks {Fi}, i = 1, 2, . . . l, will be said to be (mutually) compat-
ible if each framework employs the same Hilbert space H, and if all the projectors associated
with the different Boolean algebras Bi commute with one another. In addition, the state-
ments belonging to the different frameworks should be mapped onto the projectors in a
consistent way, so that an elementary statement which occurs in more than one framework
is mapped to the same projector. (This last point is a matter of notational consistency which
causes little difficulty in practice.) Given a compatible collection {Fi} there is a smallest
framework F which contains them all: its statements are generated from the union of the
sets of elementary statements for the individual Fi, and its Boolean algebra B of projectors
is the smallest one containing all the projectors of all the Boolean algebras Bi associated
with the different frameworks in the collection. We shall say that the compatible collection
{Fi} generates this smallest framework F .
Two or more frameworks which are not compatible are called incompatible. The distinc-
tive problems associated with quantum reasoning arise from the existence of frameworks
which use the same Hilbert space, and can thus (potentially) refer to the same physical
system, but which are mutually incompatible because the projectors associated with one
framework do not commute with those of another. There is nothing quite like this in clas-
sical mechanics, since the classical counterparts of projectors always commute with one
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another.
We adopt the following as a fundamental rule. A meaningful quantum description must
consist of a single framework and one of its statements, (F , f), or else a compatible col-
lection of frameworks {Fi} and associated statements {fi}, which together form a collective
description {(Fi, fi)}. A collective description can always be replaced by a single master
description (D, d), where D is the framework generated by the collection {Fi}, and d is any
statement such that
D = ϕ(d) = F1F2 · · ·Fl (9)
is the product of the projectors Fi = ϕ(fi) corresponding to the different statements.
The rules for logical reasoning about quantum descriptions are similar to the rules for
reasoning about classical descriptions, but with the additional requirement that all the frame-
works must be compatible. A logical argument begins with a a set of assumptions, which is
to say a set of descriptions {(Ai, ai)}, i = 1, 2, . . . l, associated with a compatible family {Ai}
of frameworks; one is assuming that these descriptions are simultaneously true (within the
framework generated by the collection {Ai}). From these assumptions one can deduce a set
of valid conclusions {(Cj, cj)}, j = 1, 2, . . .m, provided the union of the collections {Ai} and
{Cj} is a compatible collection of frameworks, and
ϕ(cj)A = A, (10)
holds for every j, where
A = A1A2 · · ·Al (11)
is the product of the projectors Ai = ϕ(ai). The set of assumptions can always be replaced
by the corresponding master description acting as a single assumption, since the process
of reasoning just described allows one to deduce the original set of assumptions from this
master description. Avalid argument can begin with the true assumption (F , I), where F is
any framework, and I is the identity operator.
It is extremely important that within a single argument, all the frameworks, for both
the assumptions and conclusions, be compatible. In particular, the following sort of “quasi-
classical reasoning”, many examples of which are to be found in the published literature, is
not valid: One starts with an assumption (A, a), and from it deduces a conclusion (C, c),
after checking that the frameworks A and C are compatible. Next, (C, c) is used as the
assumption in an argument whose conclusion is (E , e), again after checking that the frame-
works C and E are compatible. Combining these two arguments one draws the conclusion
that “is a is true, then e must be true”. But this reasoning process is only correct if A and E
are compatible frameworks; if they are incompatible, it is invalid. (Note that compatibility
is not a transitive relationship: A can be compatible with C and C with E at the same time
that A is incompatible with E .) Failure to check compatibility can easily lead to inconsistent
quantum reasoning which, just like inconsistent classical reasoning, often produces contra-
dictions and paradoxes. In order to avoid making mistakes of the sort just described, it is
helpful to think of a single quantum argument as a process in which the assumptions, which
themselves form a (collective) description, are extended into a longer and longer collective
description by adding additional simple descriptions without ever erasing anything; in par-
ticular, without forgetting the original assumptions. The compatibility rule for collective
quantum descriptions will then rule out any attempt to introduce incompatible frameworks.
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On the other hand, two or more separate arguments may very well involve different,
and perhaps incompatible frameworks. But then they cannot be combined into a single
argument. As an example, it is possible to construct two perfectly valid arguments, each
based upon the same assumption (A, a), one leading to the conclusion (C, c) and the other
to the conclusion (E , e), where the frameworks C and E are incompatible. If one grants the
truth of the assumption, then c is true relative to framework C, and e is true relative to
framework E . However, there is no framework relative to which it can be said that both c
and e are true statements. Given a particular physical system for which the assumptions
are satisfied, it is possible in principle to check the validity of either c or e by means of
measurements, but not (at least in general) the validity of both. An example (involving
histories) which illustrates this point will be found in Sec. V B below.
If one wishes to describe a quantum system, it is necessary to choose a framework, if
only implicitly, and in all but the most trivial cases this choice means that there are many
incompatible frameworks whose statements cannot be employed in the description. While
the choice of a framework does not in any way “influence” the system being described, Sec. II
A, it severely constrains what can sensibly be said about it. Thus if one wants to talk about
the energy, this requires the use of certain projectors, depending on how precisely one wants
to specify the energy, and what ranges one is interested in. It is then not possible, as part of
the same description, to talk about something else represented by projectors which do not
commute with the set employed for the energy.
The type of exclusion which arises from incompatible frameworks is easily confused with,
but is in fact quite different from the sort of exclusion which arises all the time in classical
mechanical descriptions, where in order that some property p be true, it is necessary that
some other property q be false (because the corresponding subsets of the classical phase
space do not overlap, Sec. II B). This “classical” type of exclusion also arises in quantum
systems where, to take the example of a spin 1/2 particle, “Sx = 1/2” and “Sx = −1/2” are
mutually exclusive statements belonging to the same framework: if one is true, the other is
false.
By contrast, if p and q are assertions about a particular quantum system represented by
projectors P and Q which do not commute, they cannot be part of the same framework.
Hence in a framework P in which it makes sense to talk about the truth and falsity of
p, there is no way of discussing whether q is true or false, since within this framework q
makes no sense. Conversely, in a framework Q in which q makes sense, and could be true
or false, p has no meaning. Thus the truth of p does not make q false; it does mean that
because we have (perhaps implicitly) adopted a framework in which it makes sense to talk
about p, q cannot be discussed. Similarly, the combination p ∧ q, or “p and q”, is not part
of any framework, and therefore cannot be true or false. It is “meaningless” in the sense
that within quantum theory one cannot ascribe any meaning to it. In mathematical logic
there are certain combinations of symbols, for example p∧∨q, which are “nonsense” because
they are not “well-formed formulas”, they are not constructed according to the rules for
combining symbols of the language to form meaningful statements. In the quantum case,
where the rules are, of course, different from those of classical logic, p ∧ q (and also p ∨ q,
etc.) has this nonsensical character when PQ 6= QP .
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IV Quantum Systems at Many Times
IV A Classical Analogy
A classical stochastic process, such as rolling a die several times in succession, is a more
useful analogy to quantum time dependence than is a continuous trajectory in a classical
phase space. If a die is rolled three times in succession, the possible outcomes are triples of
numbers (d1, d2, d3), 1 ≤ dj ≤ 6, which together constitute the set
D˜ = D3 (12)
of 216 = 63 histories, the sample space of classical probability theory. Here D is the set of
possible outcomes of one toss. A statement such as p: “the sum of the first two tosses is
four”, is associated with the subset P˜ = ϕ(p) of D˜ consisting of those histories for which p
is true. The process of logical inference employing statements of this kind is then formally
identical to that discussed in Sec. II.B. For example, from p one can immediately infer r:
“the sum of all three tosses is five or more” by noting that P˜ is a subset of R˜ = ϕ(r), the
set of histories where r is true.
On the other hand, the statement q: “the sum of all three tosses is exactly seven”, is
not a logical consequence of p, since Q˜ = ϕ(q) is a subset of p. However, if probabilities are
assigned to D˜, one can compute the conditional probability
Pr(q | p) = W (Q˜ ∩ P˜ )/W (P˜ ) (13)
of q given p, using weights W (A˜) for subsets A˜ of D˜. In the case of an unloaded die,
W (A˜) is just the number of elements (histories) in the set A˜. On the other hand, making
appropriate replacements in (13), one sees that Pr(r | p) = 1. Indeed, as long as every history
has a finite weight, there is a close connection between r being a logical consequence of p,
and Pr(r | p) = 1; the only difference comes about in the case in which the statement p
corresponds to an empty set with zero weight, for which the right side of (13) is undefined.
IV B Histories and Projectors
The simplest type of history for a quantum system with Hilbert space H is constructed in
the following way. Let a finite set of times t′1 < t
′
2 < · · · < t′j be given, and at each t′j
let P ′j be a projector onto a closed subspace of H. The history consists of the set of times
and the associated projectors, representing properties of the system which are true at the
corresponding times. So that this history can be discussed within the same framework as
other histories defined at different sets of times, it is convenient to suppose that there is a
common set of times
t1 < t2 < · · · < tn (14)
sufficiently large to include all those associated with the different histories in the framework,
and that a particular history is represented by a sequence of projectors P1, P2, . . . Pn, one for
each of the times in (14). To do this, Pk is set equal to the identity I if tk is not one of the
times for which the history was originally defined, and to P ′j if tk = t
′
j . Since the “property”
represented by I is always true, it may be “added” to the original history at additional times
without modifying its physical significance.
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Rather than representing a history with a sequence of projectors P1, P2, . . . Pn, it is tech-
nically more convenient to employ a single projector
P˜ = P1 ⊗ P2 ⊗ · · · ⊗ Pn (15)
on the tensor product space
H˜ = H⊗H⊗ · · · ⊗ H (16)
of n copies of H, which is analogous to D˜ in the classical case discussed earlier. It is obvious
that if each of the Pj on the right side of (15) is a projector, so is P˜ ; on the other hand,
not every projector on H˜ has the form (15). It will be convenient to extend the concept of
a history to include any projector on H˜. The resulting category of generalized histories is
large enough to include the proposals made by Omne`s [14] (“non-Griffiths histories”), and by
Gell-Mann and Hartle [15] (“history-dependent decompositions of the identity”), and much
else besides. However, the applications discussed in Sec. V are all of the restricted form (15),
hereafter referred to as simple histories .
A framework F for the case of many times can be constructed in the following way. We
suppose that there are a finite number of elementary statements p, q, . . ., and that to each
of these there corresponds a projector on H˜, representing some (generalized) history. As
in the case of a quantum system at one time, we require that all these projectors commute
with each other. They are therefore members of a smallest Boolean algebra B˜ of commuting
projectors closed under the operations of products and complements, where I˜ − P˜ is the
complement of P˜ , and
I˜ = I ⊗ I ⊗ · · · ⊗ I (17)
is the identity on H˜. Additional statements formed from the elementary statements by
logical operations will also be mapped onto elements of B˜ following the rules in (5). Thus
the structure is formally the same as that in Sec. III. However, for a framework involving
histories to be acceptable it must also satisfy consistency conditions, which is the next topic.
IV C Consistency and Weights
Various consistency conditions have been proposed by various authors; what follows is closest
in spirit to [22], while very much indebted to the ideas in [15]. In the following discussion it
will be convenient to assume that the Hilbert space H is finite dimensional, so that there are
no questions about convergence of sums. This will not bother low-brow physicists who are
quite content to consider a quantum system in a box of finite volume with an upper bound
(as large as one wishes) on the energy. Extending the formalism in a mathematically precise
way to an infinite-dimensional H remains an open problem.
Let T (t′, t) be the unitary time transformation which represents Schro¨dinger time evo-
lution from time t to time t′. In the case of a time-independent Hamiltonian H it is given
by:
T (t′, t) = exp[−i(t′ − t)H/~]. (18)
The discussion which follows is not restricted to time-independent Hamiltonians, but we do
require that T (t′, t) be unitary and satisfy the conditions
T (t, t) = I,
T (t, t′)T (t′, t′′) = T (t, t′′),
(19)
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which imply that T (t, t′) is the inverse of T (t′, t).
Given T (t′, t), one can define a mapping from an arbitrary operator A˜ on Hn to an
operator K(A˜) on H by means of the formula:
〈i|K(A˜)|j〉 = ∑
k2
∑
k3
. . .
∑
kn
∑
l1
∑
l2
. . .
∑
ln−1
〈ik2k3 . . . kn|A˜|l1l2 . . . ln−1j〉
×〈l1|T (t1, t2)|k2〉〈l2|(T (t2, t3)|k3〉 · · · 〈ln−1|T (tn−1, tn)|kn〉,
(20)
where the matrix elements refer to some orthonormal basis {|j〉} of H and the corresponding
tensor product basis of Hn. If, in particular, A˜ is a projector P˜ of the form (15), then K(P˜ )
takes the form:
K(P˜ ) = P1T (t1, t2)P2T (t2, t3) · · ·T (tn−1, tn)Pn. (21)
Using K, we define the bilinear consistency functional C on pairs of operators A˜, B˜ on H˜
by means of the formula:
C(A˜, B˜) = C∗(B˜, A˜) = Tr[K†(A˜)K(B˜)]. (22)
Note that C(A˜, A˜) is non-negative. If both A˜ and B˜ are projectors of the form (15), the
consistency functional is the same as the Gell-Mann and Hartle decoherence functional if
the density matrix in the latter is replaced by I.
Because H˜ is finite-dimensional, the Boolean algebra B˜ associated with F contains a
finite number of projectors, and consequently there are a set of non-zero minimal elements
{M˜ (α)}, α = 1, 2, . . . which form a decomposition of the identity,
I˜ =
∑
α
M˜ (α), M˜ (α)M˜ (β) = δαβM˜
(α), (23)
in terms of which any projector P˜ in B˜ can be written in the form
P˜ =
∑
α
mαM˜
(α), (24)
with each mα equal to 0 or 1, depending on P˜ . An acceptable framework F must satisfy the
following consistency condition in terms of these minimal elements:
C(M˜ (α), M˜ (β)) = 0 whenever α 6= β. (25)
If this is satisfied, a non-negative weightW (P˜ ) can be defined for every element of B˜ through
the formula:
W (P˜ ) = C(P˜ , P˜ ), (26)
and these weights can be used to generate conditional probabilities in analogy with the
classical case, (13), and as discussed in [13] and [22]. In particular, with P˜ = ϕ(p) and
Q˜ = ϕ(q) the projectors associated with p and q, the counterpart of (13) is the formula
Pr(q | p) =W (P˜ Q˜)/W (P˜ ), (27)
with W defined by (26).
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If only a single time is involved, then it is easy to show that the consistency condition (25)
is automatically satisfied. It is also automatically satisfied for all families of simple histories
involving only two times, n = 2. However, in the case of generalized histories involving two
or more times, and simple histories involving three or more times, the consistency condition
is a non-trivial restriction on acceptable families.
The consistency functional (22), unlike the decoherence functional of Gell-Mann and
Hartle, does not involve a density matrix. This means that the former, unlike the latter,
does not single out a direction of time. There seems to be no good reason why a density
matrix should appear in a fundamental formulation of quantum mechanics, especially since
its classical analog is properly part of classical statistical mechanics rather than classical
mechanics as such. To be sure, a density matrix may also arise in quantum mechanics,
unlike classical mechanics, as a technical device for describing the state of a subsystem of a
total system when the latter is in a pure state. But it is not needed for describing a single
closed system, which is what we are considering here. (Also see the remarks in Sec. V D.)
IV D Frameworks, Compatibility, and Logical Inference
The discussion above can be summarized by saying that a framework F for a quantum system
at several times, usually called a consistent family of histories, consists of a collection of
statements generated from a set of elementary statements by logical operations, together with
a mapping ϕ, conforming in an appropriate way to the logical operations, of these statements
onto a Boolean algebra of commuting projectors on H˜, with the additional requirement that
the minimal elements of this algebra satisfy the consistency condition (25).
A description is then a pair (F , f), consisting of the framework or consistent family
F and one of its statements f . We shall, with a certain lack of precision, call both the
description (F , f) and the corresponding statement f a quantum history. This ought not to
cause confusion if one remembers that statements by themselves do not have a meaning (and,
in particular, cannot be true or false) unless they are embedded in or associated with some
framework, which can either be specified explicitly by giving the pair (F , f), or implicitly.
In particular, if F˜ is the projector corresponding to f , then the smallest Boolean algebra
containing F˜ defines, in the absence of any other information, an implicit framework for f ,
and this algebra will be part of the Boolean algebra of any consistent family which has f as
one of its statements. (Note that for a particular projector F˜ , even this smallest Boolean
algebra may not satisfy the consistency condition (25); in such a case f is an inconsistent
(meaningless) history, which cannot be part of any consistent family.)
The intuitive significance of a history (F , f) is very similar to that of a description
at a single time, as discussed in Sec. III. In particular, in the case of a simple history
corresponding to (15), one thinks of the quantum system as actually possessing the property
(represented by) Pj at each time tj, if this history is the one which actually occurs. Quantum
mechanics, as a stochastic theory, cannot (in general) guarantee that such a history takes
place; instead, it assigns it a probability, based on some assumption, such as the occurrence
of the initial state, using the weights generated by the consistency functional. An empirical
check on these probabilities is possible “in principle”, i.e., by idealized measurements which
do not violate the principles of quantum theory; see the extensive discussion in [13].
For a finite collection {Fi} of consistent families to be (mutually) compatible, they must,
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to begin with, refer to a common tensor product H˜, (16), or else it must be possible to achieve
this by defining H˜ using a larger collection of times than those found in the individual
families, and then extending the latter by adding identity operators to the histories at
the times not previously considered. Next comes a requirement of notational consistency:
statements belonging to the different frameworks must be mapped onto the projectors in a
consistent way, so that an elementary statement which occurs in more than one framework
is mapped to the same projector. There are then two additional and specifically quantum
conditions. The first is the same as in Sec. III.A: projectors corresponding to the different
Boolean algebras B˜i of the different families must commute with each other. The second is
the consistency condition (25) imposed on the minimal elements of the Boolean algebra B˜
associated with the smallest consistent family F containing all the Fi, the family generated
by the collection {Fi}.
Given these definitions, one has the same fundamental rule as in Sec. III.B; worded in
terms of histories, it reads: A meaningful quantum history must consist of a single consistent
family together with one of its histories (statements), (F , f), or else a compatible collection
of consistent families {Fi} and associated histories {fi}, which together form a collective
history (or description) {(Fi, fi)}. A collective history can always be replaced by a single
master history (D, d), where D is the consistent family generated by the collection {Fi}, and
d is any history corresponding to the projector D˜ which is the product of the projectors F˜i
corresponding to the histories fi, as in (9).
The rules for logical reasoning in the case of histories are similar to those for a quantum
system at one time, Sec. III B, except that they are based upon conditional probabilities con-
structed from ratios of weights, using (27). An argument begins with a a set of assumptions,
which is to say a set of histories or descriptions {(Ai, ai)}, i = 1, 2, . . . l, associated with a
compatible set {Ai} of consistent families; one is assuming that these histories are simulta-
neously true (within the consistent family generated by the collection {Ai}). From these
one can deduce a set of valid conclusions {(Cj , cj)}, j = 1, 2, . . .m, provided the union of the
collections {Ai} and {Cj} is a compatible collection of consistent families, and provided
Pr(cj | A˜) = W (C˜jA˜)/W (A˜) = 1 (28)
holds for every j, where C˜j = ϕ(cj), and
A˜ = A˜1A˜2 · · · A˜l, (29)
with A˜i the projector associated with the history ai. In order for the inference to be valid,
we require that W (A˜) be positive, so the right side of (28) is defined. The case W (A˜) =
0 corresponds to a probability of zero that all of the assumptions in the argument are
simultaneously satisfied, and is thus similar to having contradictory hypotheses in ordinary
logic. Excluding the possibility of making any inferences from probability zero cases, as
suggested here, seems intrinsically no worse than the solution in ordinary logic, in which any
statement whatsoever can be inferred from a contradiction.
These rules coincide with those given in Sec. III B in the particular case where n = 1,
assuming H is finite dimensional, because W (P ) for a projector P is then just the dimension
of the space onto which P projects. The case of contradictory assumptions, A = 0, again
forms an exception, for the reasons discussed above.
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The remarks at the end of Sec. III B about the necessity of choosing a particular frame-
work in order to describe a quantum system also apply to a quantum history. It is necessary
to choose some consistent family, if only implicitly, in order to describe the time develop-
ment of a quantum system, and while this choice has no influence upon the system itself, it
constrains what can sensibly be said about it. The consistent family is not itself either true
or false, but a history can be true or false, i.e., occur or not occur, as one of the possibilities
within a consistent family. As long as one considers a single family, a particular history may
well exclude another history in the sense that the probability is zero that both occur. But
this sort of exclusion is very different from that which arises when two histories f and g are
incompatible in the sense that there is no consistent family which includes both of them.
In such a case, the occurrence of history f does not imply that g does not occur; what it
means is that in order to even talk about the occurrence of f , we must employ a framework
or consistent family in which it makes no sense to say whether or not g occurs, since g is not
one of the histories in this family, and could not be added to this family without making it
inconsistent. For the same reason, statements such as “f and g”, or “f or g”, make no sense
when these histories cannot both belong to a single consistent family. Such combinations are
like improperly-formed formulas in mathematical logic, sequences of symbols which cannot
be interpreted because they are not constructed according to the rules appropriate to the
particular language under discussion.
V Applications
V A Measurements
As a simple example of a measurement, consider the process of determining Sx, the x compo-
nent of spin, for a spin 1/2 particle using a Stern-Gerlach apparatus equipped with detectors
to determine in which channel the particle emerges from the region where there is a magnetic
field gradient. The essential features of the unitary time transformation T (t2, t1) from a time
t1 before the measurement takes place to a time t2 after it is completed are, in an obvious
notation:
|α,X〉→|α′, X+〉, |β,X〉→|β ′, X−〉, (30)
where |α〉 corresponds to the spin state Sx = 1/2 for the particle, in units of ~, |β〉 to
Sx = −1/2, |X〉 to the “ready” state of the apparatus before the particle has arrived,
and |X+〉 and |X−〉 are apparatus states which result if the particle emerges from the field
gradient in the Sx = 1/2 or Sx = −1/2 channel, respectively. One should think of |X+〉
and |X−〉 as macroscopically distinct states corresponding to, say, two distinct positions of
a pointer which indicate the outcome of the measurement. The spin states |α′〉 and |β ′〉 at
time t2 are arbitrary; they are not relevant for the measuring process we are interested in.
Throughout the following discussion we employ a symbol outside a Dirac ket to indicate the
corresponding projector; for example:
α = |α〉〈α|, X+ = |X+〉〈X+|. (31)
As a first framework or consistent family F1, we use the one generated by α, β and X
at t1, and X
+ and X− at t2. To use the terminology of Sec IV, F1 contains statements
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of the type p: “Sx = 1/2 at time t1”, q: “the pointer at t2 corresponds to the apparatus
having detected the particle emerging in the Sx = 1/2 channel”, and the like, which are then
mapped to projectors
ϕ(p) = α⊗ I, ϕ(q) = I ⊗X+, (32)
etc., on H2. The result is a Boolean algebra of projectors associated with a family of simple
histories at only two times, which is therefore automatically consistent.
Given the framework F1, it is possible to use the weights (26) generated by the consistency
functional, see [13, 22], to calculate various conditional probabilities such as:
Pr(α, t1 |X+, t2) = 1, Pr(β, t1 |X+, t2) = 0. (33)
Stated in words, given that the apparatus is in state X+ at t2, one can be sure that the
particle was in the spin state Sx = 1/2 and not Sx = −1/2 at time t1. This is certainly
the sort of result which one would expect to emerge from a reasonable quantum theory of
measurement, and which does, indeed, emerge if one chooses an appropriate framework.
Next, consider a situation in which for some reason one knows that the particle at time
t1 has a spin polarization Sz = 1/2 corresponding to the spin state
|γ〉 = (|α〉+ |β〉)/
√
2; (34)
for example, the particle may have come through a spin polarizer which selected this polar-
ization. What will happen during the measurement process? We adopt as a framework the
consistent family F2 which is generated by γ (Sz = 1/2),
|δ〉 = (|α〉 − |β〉)/
√
2 (35)
(Sz = −1/2), and X at t1; and, as before, X+ and X− at t2. Using this framework (again,
consistency is automatic) and the weights generated by the consistency functional, one can
calculate probabilities such as:
Pr(X+, t2 | γ,X, t1) = Pr(X−, t2 | γ,X, t1) = 1/2. (36)
Stated in words, given that Sz = 1/2 and the apparatus was ready at t1, the probability is
1/2 that the apparatus is in the X+ state, and 1/2 that it is in the X− state at time t2.
All discussions within the framework of standard quantum mechanics eventually arrive at
the conclusion (36), but many of them are forced to make equivocations and unsatisfactory
excuses along the way. The reason is that they adopt (implicitly) yet another framework,
F3, which is generated by γ and δ at t1, and at t2 the state
|G〉 = T (t2, t1)|γ,X〉 = (|α′, X+〉+ |β ′, X−〉)/
√
2. (37)
with projector G. To be sure, F3 is an acceptable framework, the consistency conditions are
satisfied, and within this framework one can derive the conditional probability
Pr(G, t2 | γ,X, t1) = 1. (38)
Stated in words, it is the case that if one uses the consistent family F3, the state G will
occur with certainty at t2, given that Sz = 1/2 and the apparatus was ready at t1.
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The problem, of course, is that |G〉 is a macroscopic quantum superposition (MQS), or
Schro¨dinger’s cat state, and tells one nothing whatsoever about the position of the pointer
on the apparatus. Indeed, adopting F3 makes it impossible even to discuss whether the
apparatus is in state X+ or X− at the end of the measuring process, because the projectors
X+ and X− do not commute with G. All attempts to somehow deduce that the pointer is
in one position or the other “for all practical purposes” are nonsensical once framework F3
has been adopted, in agreement with Bell’s observations [24], based upon more intuitive, but
nonetheless quite reasonable arguments. If one wants to talk about the pointer positions,
it is necessary to adopt a framework which includes the possibility of making references
to such positions, for example, F2. But note that within F2 it is equally nonsensical to
refer to the MQS state G. Thus one sees that the enormous confusion which surrounds
most discussions of “the measurement problem” is generated by a failure to distinguish the
different frameworks or consistent families which are possible in quantum theory, and to note
that a description employing one framework necessarily excludes certain statements valid in
other, incompatible frameworks.
The consistent family F2, while it evades the problem of “ghostly” MQS states, can be
faulted as a description of a measurement process in that the outcome of the measurement
in terms of pointer positions is not correlated with a property of the particle before the
measurement. This can be remedied by embedding F2 in a larger framework F4 which is
generated by the events already included in F2 at t1 and t2, and, in addition, α and β,
Sx = ±1/2, at a time t1.5 which is later than t1 but earlier than the instant when the particle
actually enters the magnetic field gradient of the apparatus. It turns out that F4 is consistent
(this must be checked, as it is no longer automatic), and using it one can show, among other
things, that
Pr(α, t1.5 | γ,X, t1;X+, t2) = 1, (39)
i.e., given the initial state at t1, and the fact that at t2 the pointer indicates that the particle
has emerged in the Sx = 1/2 channel, it follows that the spin state was Sx = 1/2 at the time
t1.5. Thus, using this framework, one can again say that the apparatus after the measurement
indicates a state possessed by the particle before the measurement. There is, incidentally,
nothing incompatible between having Sz = 1/2 at t1 and Sx = 1/2 at t1.5 for the same
particle, since these statements belong to the same framework or consistent family. This is
just one of the ways in which consistent quantum reasoning, with its precise rules, allows
one to go well beyond what is possible in standard quantum mechanics slavishly interpreted
in terms of ill-defined “measurements”.
This set of examples shows that a satisfactory theory of quantum measurement requires
the use of a framework which includes the possibility of discussing both the outcome shown
by the apparatus and, at a time before the measurement, the properties of the measured
system which the measurement is designed to detect. To be sure, precisely the same con-
ditions apply to a satisfactory theory of measurement in the context of classical mechanics.
The difference is that in the classical case the choice of an appropriate framework can be
made implicitly with no difficulty, whereas in the quantum case it is necessary to choose it
with some care, in order to avoid meaningless statements associated with attempts to mix
descriptions belonging to incompatible frameworks.
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V B Spin of a Particle Between Two Measurements
The following example, with trivial differences in notation, is from [13]; applying the rules for
descriptions contained in the present paper clarifies the original presentation and responds
to certain criticisms [18, 25].
Consider a spin 1/2 particle which passes through two successive devices which measure
the spin polarization, Fig. 1. The first device measures Sx without changing it, so the unitary
transformation is
|α,X〉→|α,X+〉, |β,X〉→|β,X−〉, (40)
which is identical to (30) except that the spin states α (Sx = 1/2) and β (Sx = −1/2) are
the same before and after the measurement. As in Sec. V A, |X〉 is the “ready” state of the
device, and |X+〉 and |X−〉 correspond to the two different pointer positions indicating the
results of the measurement. The second device, Fig. 1, is similar, except that it measures Sz,
with states |Z〉 (“ready”), and |Z+〉 and |Z−〉 corresponding to having measured Sz = 1/2
and Sz = −1/2, respectively.
As indicated in Fig. 1, let t1 be some time before the particle enters the first device,
when its spin state is |γ〉, corresponding to Sz = 1/2; t2 a time when it is between the two
devices; and t3 a time when the particle has left the second device, and the pointers on
both devices indicate the results of the respective measurements. Suppose that at t3 the
measuring devices are in states |X+〉 and |Z+〉. What can one conclude about the spin of
the particle at the time t2 when it was between the two devices?
First consider a consistent family F1 generated by the initial state
|ψ1〉 = |γXZ〉 (41)
at t1 together with the pointer positions for both devices at t3. Consistency is automatic,
as simple histories at only two times are involved. Using this family, one can calculate the
conditional probabilities for the final pointer positions given the initial state; for example,
Pr(X+Z+, t3 |ψ1, t1) = 1/4. (42)
Next consider the family F2 obtained from F1 by adding Sx at time t2. This family is
consistent, and using the corresponding weights one can show that
Pr(Sx = 1/2, t2 |ψ1, t1;X+Z+, t3) = 1; (43)
for the detailed calculation, see [13]. That is, given the initial state and the final pointer
positions, one can be certain that at the intermediate time t2 the particle was in a spin state
Sx = 1/2. Note that this inference can be checked, in principle, by inserting a third device
between the first two, shown dashed in Fig. 1, which measures Sx, and verifying that it yields
the same result as the first device.
One can also consider the family F3 obtained from F1 by adding Sz at time t2. This,
too, is consistent, and with the help of the corresponding weights (again, details are in [13])
one can show that
Pr(Sz = 1/2, t2 |ψ1, t1;X+Z+, t3) = 1. (44)
That is, given the same conditions as in (43) one can conclude that at the time t2 the
particle was in a spin state Sz = 1/2. This inference is not particularly surprising when one
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remembers that, as shown in Sec. V A, the outcome of a measurement allows one to infer
the state of the measured system prior to the time when the measurement takes place, if one
uses an appropriate consistent family.
Note that there is no inconsistency between (43) and (44), because the conclusion Sx =
1/2 holds within framework F2, and Sz = 1/2 within framework F3, and these two frame-
works are incompatible with each other, even though each one separately is compatible with
F1. Thus we have an example of the possibility noted in Sec. III B, of two logical arguments
based upon the same assumption, but using incompatible frameworks, and whose conclusions
cannot, therefore, be combined.
The correctness of Sz = 1/2, within the framework F3, can be verified, in principle, by
inserting a third device between the first two, Fig. 1, but this time of a type which measures
Sz, and verifying that it yields the same result as the final device the particle passes through.
One may worry that this third device somehow “creates” a value of Sz which was “not there”
before the particle passed through it. Such a worry is best put to rest by means of a precise
analysis, and the reader is invited to carry out the appropriate calculations using a framework
F4 in which, with all three devices present, Sz is specified both at t2 and at a time t2.5 when
the particle is between the two devices which measure Sz. It is easily shown that Sz has the
same value at both these times; thus, passing through the intermediate device does not alter
this component of the spin.
V C Double Slit
A complete discussion of the paradoxes associated with double-slit diffraction [26] would
require, at the very least, a theory of quantum counterfactuals, and that is beyond the scope
of the present article. A significant insight into the source of the conceptual difficulties
can, nonetheless, be obtained using the tools of Secs. III and IV. In order to focus on
the essentials, we shall use the idealization that at time t1 the particle is described by a
wavepacket ψ1(r) which is approaching the slits from the left in the geometry of Fig. 2, and
that at a later time t2 the wave packet resulting from ψ1(r) by unitary time evolution consists
of three pieces, two of which are waves confined to the regions RA and RB just behind the
two slits and moving to the right, and the third a reflected wave located to the left of, and
traveling away from the slits. And we shall regard the presence, at time t2, of the particle in
RA, represented by a projector PA, as equivalent to the statement that “the particle passed
through slit A”, and likewise its presence in RB, projector PB, as equivalent to its having
passed through slit B. In addition, let the projector P = PA + PB correspond to the region
R = RA ∪ RB. (45)
(The projector PA acting on a wave function ψ(r) produces a function ψ˜(r) equal to ψ(r)
for r inside RA, and equal to 0 for r outside RA; PB is defined in a similar way.) By time t3
the particle, if it has passed through the slit system at all, will have been detected by one of
the detectors in the diffraction region, shown as circles in Fig. 2, where for convenience the
distance between the detectors and the slits has been considerably shortened.
All the frameworks or consistent families in the discussion which follows will include an
initial state
|Ψ1〉 = |ψ1, D1, D2, . . .Dm〉 (46)
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at time t1, where Dj indicates that detector j is ready to detect a particle. The first family
F1 we wish to consider has, in addition to the initial state, projectors D∗1, D∗2, . . . at t3, where
D∗j is a projector indicating that detector j has detected a particle. Since F1 involves simple
histories at just two times, the consistency condition is satisfied, and the weights (26) may
be used to calculate the probability
Pr(D∗j , t3 |Ψ1, t1) (47)
that, given the initial conditions, the j′th counter will trigger. Its dependence on j will
exhibit the usual diffraction pattern.
The next family of interest, F2, is obtained by adding to the events of F1 an event
corresponding to the particle being in the region R (45), projector P , at time t2. This is
again a consistent family in which one can calculate quantities such as
Pr(P, t2 |Ψ1, t1) (48)
the probability that the particle was not reflected by the slit system, and
Pr(D∗j , t3 |P, t2; Ψ1, t1), (49)
the probability that the j′th counter will trigger if the particle passes through the slit system.
The latter shows the same diffraction pattern as (47), as a function of j, aside from a
multiplicative constant. On the other hand, attempting to add to F2 the events that the
particle is in one of the regions RA or RB at t2 results in an inconsistent family, despite the
fact that the corresponding projectors PA and PB can be included in a Boolean algebra of
projectors for the tensor product H3. Thus, while one can consistently say that “the particle
was in R” at time t2, it makes no sense, given this framework, to say that “the particle was
in RA, or it was in RB”. But given that R, (45), is the union of two disjoint regions RA
and RB, it is difficult not to interpret the second phrase as equivalent to the first. Thus we
have a situation where it may actually be helpful, in order to avoid confusion, to employ the
projectors themselves in place of the corresponding English phrases.
The preceding discussion shows that the consistent history analysis supports the usual
intuition that it is somehow improper to talk about which slit the particle passed through.
However, it replaces an intuition which is always a little vague with a precise mathematical
criterion based upon the Hilbert space structure of quantum mechanics. That this represents
a significant advance is evident when one comes upon circumstances, such as that in which
a detector is placed directly behind one of the slits, in which it seems intuitively plausible
that one should be able to specify the slit through which the particle passed.
Even without displacing the detectors, one can construct a framework which permits one
to say which slit the particle passed through, once again for convenience interpreting this as
an assertion about its presence in RA or RB at t2. Let F3 be the family generated by PA and
PB at t2 along with Ψ1 at t1, and (for the moment) no events at t3. As these simple histories
involve only two times, consistency is automatic. One can then calculate the probabilities
Pr(PA, t2 |Ψ1, t1), Pr(PB, t2 |Ψ1, t1), (50)
that the particle passed through slit A and slit B, respectively, and demonstrate that the
particle surely did not pass through both slits by using the fact that PAPB = ∅. If, however,
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one attempts to add to F3 events of the sort D∗j at t3, the result is an inconsistent family.
From this we see that what prevents one from sensibly talking about which slit the parti-
cle passes through in the usual discussions of double slit diffraction is directly tied to the
(implicit) requirement of being able to describe the point at which the particle will arrive,
or be detected, in the diffraction plane. A description which includes which slit the particle
goes through can also consistently include events referring to the detectors at time t3; these
events must, however, be suitable MQS states. This suggests that the absence of a precise,
clear discussion of two-slit diffraction in textbooks is not unrelated to the absence of a clear
treatment of MQS states and the measurement problem. A consistent logical analysis using
the concept of a framework is able to dispose of both problems simultaneously.
V D Emergence of the Classical World
Both Gell-Mann and Hartle [15], and Omne`s [14] have discussed, from slightly different
perspectives, how classical physics expressed in terms of suitable “hydrodynamic” variables
emerges as an approximation to a fully quantum-mechanical description of the world when
the latter is carried out using suitable frameworks, i.e., families of consistent histories. It is
not our purpose to recapitulate or even summarize their detailed technical discussions, but
instead to indicate the overall strategy, as viewed from the perspective of this paper, and
how it is related to processes of “decoherence” [28] which arise when a particular quantum
subsystem of interest interacts with a suitable environment, both of which are part of a
larger (closed) quantum system.
The basic strategy of Gell-Mann and Hartle can be thought of as the search for a suitable
“quasi-classical” framework, a consistent family whose Boolean algebra includes projectors
appropriate for representing coarse-grained variables, such as average density and average
momentum inside volume elements which are not too small, variables which can plausibly
be thought of as the quantum counterparts of properties which enter into hydrodynamic
and other descriptions of the world provided by classical physics. Hence it is necessary first
to find suitable commuting projectors, and then to show that the consistency conditions
are satisfied for the corresponding Boolean algebra. Omne`s states his strategy in somewhat
different terms which, however, seem at least roughly compatible with the point of view just
expressed. (The actual technical calculations of Gell-Mann and Hartle, and of Omne`s are
based on simple, rather than generalized histories, in the terminology of Sec. IV B.)
One might worry that the strategies of Omne`s, and Gell-Mann and Hartle, are incom-
patible with the formulation of quantum theory contained in the present paper, because
their consistency conditions employ a density matrix, whereas that in Sec. IV C does not.
However, the difference is probably of no great importance when discussing “quasi-classical”
systems involving large numbers of particles, for the following reason. In classical statisti-
cal mechanics one knows (or at least believes!) that for macroscopic systems the choice of
ensemble—microcanonical, canonical, or grand—is for many purposes unimportant, and, in-
deed, the average behavior of the ensemble will be quite close to that of a “typical” member.
Stated in other words, the use of probability distributions is a convenience which is not “in
principle” necessary. Presumably an analogous result holds for quantum systems of macro-
scopic size: the use of a density matrix, both as an “initial condition” and as part of the
consistency requirement may be convenient, but it is not necessary when one is discussing
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the behavior of a closed system. Of course, there are issues here which deserve serious study;
the proper formulation of time-dependent phenomena in quantum statistical mechanics is
an open problem, Sec. VI B.
The task of finding an appropriate quasi-classical consistent family is made somewhat
easier by two facts. The first is that decoherence (as defined above) is quite effective in
reducing “off-diagonal” terms C(M˜ (α), M˜ (β)), with α 6= β, in the consistency functional (22)
for a suitably chosen Boolean algebra representing quasi-classical variables in circumstances
in which thermodynamic irreversibility plays a role. The second is that the consistency func-
tional is a continuous function of its arguments, and hence it is plausible that by making
small changes in the projectors forming the Boolean algebra, one can reduce the off-diagonal
elements to zero, assuming they are already small (see Dowker and Kent [19]) so that the
consistency condition (25) is satisfied. Since there is in any case some arbitrariness in choos-
ing which quantum projectors to associate with particular coarse-grained hydrodynamic
variables, small changes in these projectors are unimportant in terms of their physical inter-
pretation. Thus exact consistency does not seem difficult to achieve “in principle”, even if in
practice theoretical physicists are unlikely to be worried if the “off-diagonal” elements of the
consistency functional are not precisely zero, as long as they are suitably small in comparison
with the “diagonal” weights C(P˜ , P˜ ) which enter into a calculation of probabilities.
There are many frameworks which are not quasi-classical, and from a fundamental point
of view there is no reason to exclude using one of these to describe the world. The fun-
damental principles of quantum mechanics no more dictate the choice of a framework than
the concepts of geometry dictate which projection a draftsman must use for representing a
three-dimensional object. In both cases the issues are practical ones, related to what one
is trying to achieve. As noted in Sec.V A, a framework which includes MQS states of a
measurement apparatus after the measurement precludes any attempt to think of the pro-
cess of its interaction with the measured system as a “measurement” in the ordinary sense
of that word. Using MQS states to describe Schro¨dinger’s cat does nothing whatsoever to
the cat, but it does make it impossible to discuss whether the cat is or is not alive, for such
a discussion will employ concepts of a quasi-classical kind which cannot be included in the
chosen framework. And any quantum description which wishes to make contact with the
world of everyday experience or of experimental physics must employ some framework which
allows a description of the appropriate kind.
As a final remark, the fact that in Sec. V A above no mention was made of decoherence
in addressing the “measurement problem” should not be taken to mean that considerations
of decoherence are irrelevant to discussions of quantum measurements; quite the opposite is
the case. For example, the fact that certain physical properties, such as pointer positions
in a properly designed apparatus, have a certain stability in the course of time despite
perturbations from a random environment, while other physical properties do not, is a matter
of both theoretical and practical interest. However, decoherence by itself cannot single out
a particular framework of consistent histories, nor can it disentangle conceptual dilemmas
brought about by mixing descriptions from incompatible frameworks. To the extent that
the latter form the heart of the “measurement problem”, decoherence will not resolve it, and
claims to the contrary merely add to the confusion.
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VI Summary and Open Questions
VI A Summary
The description of a quantum system and the reasoning process relating one description to
another are best thought of in terms of a framework, which serves to establish, in effect,
a topic of conversation or a point of view, and statements, which are assertions about the
state of a quantum mechanical system which are either true or false within the framework
with which they are associated. A classical analogy, Sec. II A, in which a framework must
be chosen by the person constructing the description, and truth is relative to this frame-
work, suggests that there is no reason to treat quantum descriptions as less “objective” than
their classical counterparts. The most important difference between classical and quantum
descriptions is the fact that in the quantum case there are incompatible frameworks, any
one of which could be employed for constructing descriptions of a given system, but which
cannot be combined, either for the process of describing the system or reasoning about it.
This incompatibility has no direct classical analog, and it leads to the rule which states that
any description of a quantum system must either employ a single framework or a compatible
family of frameworks. Similarly, a logical argument, leading from certain descriptions, taken
as assumptions, to other descriptions which form the conclusions, must use a single frame-
work or a compatible family of frameworks. In the case of a classical mechanical system, a
single framework suffices for all descriptions, and this framework is often chosen implicitly.
A quantum framework can also be chosen implicitly, but carelessness can lead to invalid
reasoning and to paradoxes.
The same combination of framework and statement can be used to describe the behavior
of a quantum system as a function of time. In this case the framework is usually called a
“consistent family of histories”. Once again, a valid description or history must be based
upon a single framework or consistent family, or a compatible set of consistent families, and
a logical argument leading from assumptions to conclusions must likewise employ a single
consistent family or a compatible set of families. It is convenient to represent (generalized)
histories involving n times using projectors on the tensor product of n copies of the Hilbert
space. The consistency condition can then be expressed using a bilinear consistency func-
tional of such projectors, and when consistency is satisfied, the weights which determine
conditional probabilities can also be computed using this consistency functional.
Applications of the formalism just described include measuring processes, the state of a
quantum system between measurements, double-slit diffraction, and the emergence of the
classical world from a fully quantum mechanical theory.
VI B Open Questions
The discussion of consistency in Sec. IV C was carried out assuming a finite-dimensional
Hilbert space in order to ensure, among other things, that the trace (22) and the mini-
mal elements (23) of the Boolean algebra B˜ exist. It seems likely that by making suitable
restrictions on B˜, the concept of consistency can be extended in a satisfactory way to an
infinite-dimensional Hilbert space, but this needs to be worked out in detail. There are
similar technical issues associated with frameworks which employ an infinite collection of
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elementary statements, the compatibility of infinite collections of frameworks, and histories
defined at an infinite set of times.
The structure for quantum reasoning proposed in this paper includes no mechanism
for dealing with counterfactuals (“if the counter had not been located directly behind the
slit, then the particle would have . . .”). Inasmuch as many quantum paradoxes, including
some of the ones associated with double-slit diffraction, and certain derivations of Bell’s
inequality and analogous results, make use of counterfactuals, disentangling them requires
an analysis which goes beyond what is found in the present paper. As philosophers have yet
to reach general agreement on a satisfactory scheme for counterfactual reasoning applied to
the classical world [27], an extension which covers all of quantum reasoning is likely to be
difficult. On the other hand, a scheme sufficient to handle the special sorts of counterfactual
reasoning found in common quantum paradoxes probably represents a simpler problem.
The proper formulation of time-dependent phenomena in quantum statistical mechanics
remains an open question. On the one hand, as noted in Sec. V D, it seems plausible that
various formulas which yield the “average” behavior of some macroscopic system are not in
need of revision, since, among other things, this “average” is likely to be essentially the same
as the behavior of a typical member of an ensemble, and because decoherence (interaction
with the environment) is very effective in removing violations of the consistency conditions
if one chooses an appropriate “quasi-classical” consistent family. The results obtained in
[14, 15] are quite encouraging in this connection. On the other hand, thought needs to be
given to those cases in which different members of an ensemble have significantly different
behavior, that is, where “fluctuations” are important. In any event, it would be useful to
have a restatement of the fundamental principles of quantum statistical mechanics based
upon a fully consistent interpretation of standard quantum mechanics.
Can the structure of reasoning developed in this paper for non-relativistic quantum me-
chanics be extended to relativistic quantum mechanics and quantum field theory? Various
examples suggest that the sort of peculiar non-locality which is often thought to arise from
violations of Bell’s inequality and various EPR paradoxes will disappear when one enforces
the rule that consistent quantum arguments must employ a single framework. While this
is encouraging, it is also true that locality (or the lack thereof) in non-relativistic quantum
theory has not yet been carefully analyzed from the perspective presented in this paper, and
hence must be considered among the open questions. And, of course, getting rid of spurious
non-localities is only a small step along the way towards a fully relativistic theory.
Even in the domain of non-relativistic (and non-counterfactual) quantum reasoning, there
is no proof that the scheme presented in this paper is appropriate and adequate for all of
standard quantum mechanics. Indeed, standard quantum mechanics contains a great deal of
seat-of-the-pants intuition which has never been formalized, and thus it is hard to think of
any way of testing the system of reasoning presented here apart from applying it to a large
number of examples, to see if it yields what the experts agree are the “right answers”, and
what the experimentalists find in their laboratories. During the past ten years consistent
history ideas have been applied to many different situations without encountering serious
problems, but there is always the possibility that the fatal flaw lies just around the next
corner. If such a flaw exists, it should not be hard to identify, since the scheme of reasoning
presented in this paper has precise rules and is based on “straight” quantum mechanics,
without hidden variables, adjustable parameters, modifications of the Schro¨dinger equation,
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and excuses of the “for all practical purposes” type. The reader who considers it defective
is invited to point out the problems!
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Figure Captions
Figure 1: Spin 1/2 particle passing through devices which measure Sx and Sz. A third device
may be added at the position shown by the dashed line.
Figure 2: Diffraction of a particle by two slits (see text).
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